

the cleaning of the territory around the house; 26,4% are not satisfied by the management of the managing company; 36,8% are not satisfied by the repair works in the home.

As the research shows, housing and communal services don't pay much attention to the research of the behavior of the proprietors; they study only the general perception and attitude to housing and communal services. In general, these are the sociological research works by Levada-Center, VTsIOM. We found out a number of behavior characteristics of the residents: 15,7% participate in management of their house; 36.5% watch the news in housing and communal services; 20,7% are ready to become the member of the Board of tenement houses, etc.

The results of the research have a scientific interest because of there was no before similar research, and also because of the actuality of the market analysis on the basis of the proposition of the institutional theory. The data obtained allowed to make a conclusion that the market of housing and communal services has a weakly developed institute of teaching – one of the key factors that influence the satisfaction of the final consumers.

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SHADOW ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT POLICIE

Many economists consider that single reason for the emergence of a shadow or informal economy is rooted in high tax burdens. Schneider writes that research using macroeconomic and microeconomic modeling of actual economies reveals that increases in the tax burden and in payments for social insurance combined with increased constraints on the official labor market are determining scale and speed of growth of the shadow economy. Certain role is also rested on the wage rates in the official economy. But if we take a

closer look at certain countries (Sweden, Germany, Austria) we will see that high taxes and comparatively small shadow economy may coexist. It seems now that relationship between these two variables is not linear and there could be much deeper reasons that determine dynamics of shadow economic activity.

Existing approaches to this topic show that most authors are estimating tax burden and bureaucracy as major reasons for emergence of a shadow economy. But as it was mentioned earlier in this paper, there are several real-world violations to this rule. Thus we suggest that there are important factors other than tax burden and bureaucracy, which determine the size of a shadow economy (for example, the quality of public services and demand for public services from the private sector). We suggest a new model that could be employed to describe relationship between public and private sectors.

The authors developed such model. Bases of the model is a game between two economic agents: government and households. Each one has its own utility function that depend on household consumption and government revenues correspondingly.

Research this model shows that difference in utility functions of government and private sector is an important factor in appearance of a shadow economy in addition to tax burden and bureaucracy effects. During political elections private sector chooses government that has a utility function with a smallest discrepancy with its own. Thus we would assume that growth of a shadow economy could be one of the indicators of private sector becoming increasingly unhappy with current government.

Calculations by the Russian shadow economy shows post-crisis growth of the shadow economy, while it decreased from 2000th to 2007th year. This can be associated with a period of increasing public discontent, expressed in meetings and increased activity of the opposition.

This relationship is also observed for the European countries, as a the correlation distribution of the vote between the main parties and the opposition, and the dynamics of the shadow economy.

Government could decrease size of a shadow economy by reducing a tax burden or by increasing the efficiency of public good production. Latter could be achieved by reducing corruption while meeting government budget goals and by increasing efficiency of provided services. In particular, low sizes of shadow economy given high taxes in certain countries could be explained with high quality of public services and private sector willingness to consume them.